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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the agencification phenomena as one of New Public Management (NPM)-
based administrative reform initiatives. Thailand, Hong Kong, and Pakistan were chosen be-
cause of their similarity on administrative legacy and availability of data. The study uses a re-
view of literature research method, while comparative approach was employed to analyze expe-
riences of agencification in the three selected cases. Research result showed that the three 
countries implemented agencification in different ways; rational agency model is not the only 
driver for agencification initiatives; and contextual factor that include traditions, cultures, 
structures, and values influence the implementation of agencification process as a public sector 
reform initiative. Policy implications can be drawn by reading the three countries on agencifi-
cation. Thus,  Indonesia, as one of NPM adopters can learn from experience gleaned from the 
three polities in conducting its administrative reform agenda.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of agencies has been one 
of the megatrends in New Public Manage-
ment (NPM)-based administrative reform. 
The increasing number of agencies in many 
countries (James, 2003; Jordana, Levi-Faur, 
& i Marin, 2011; Pollit, Bathgate, Caulfield, 
Smullen, & Talbot, 2001; Smullen, 2007; 
Verhoest, van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid, 
2012) and supra-national level (BUSUIOC, 
2016; Egeberg & Trondal, 2016; Ongaro, 
Barbieri, Belle, & Fedele, 2012) shows how 
this idea has been  spreading around the 
globe.  
This form of  organizing is known as 
agencification, which refers to the establish-
ment of  autonomous bodies  within the 
framework of  performance contract-based 
result control instead of political intervention 
as the main feature. This is in line with the 
essence   of  reengineering,  which is  based 
on the premise of altering outdated rule and 
replacement with  a new one (Muchiri, 
1999) the agencification can also be catego-
rized as public organization reengineering. 
The process of reengineering is aimed trans-
form and minimize outdated-hierarchical 
mechanism and change public organizations 
become flatter and more efficient.    
During the zenith of the  popularity of  
the NPM paradigm, governments were  con-
fident that the creation of agencies that were 
detached or separated from parent ministries 
would generate economic, institutional, and 
political benefits  (Pollitt & Talbot, 2003; 
Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2004; 
Verhoest et al., 2012). 
Similar to other doctrines such as pri-
vatization, agencification soon became a 
buzzword in public administration reform 
literature and practice (Wettenhall, 2005). 
Many developing countries especially in 
Asia, immediately jumped on the bandwag-
on to adopt agencification as a reform agen-
da. Thailand, Hong Kong, and Pakistan are 
chosen as the locus of this study for two rea-
sons. Firstly, both Hong Kong and Pakistan 
have British legacy in their administrative 
system and Thailand is perceived to be one 
of South East Asian countries that adopted 
NPM agencification (Haque, 2013). To that 
end, the case studies have a wealth of experi-
ence in the realm of agencification, albeit in 
varied forms. Accordingly, the three case 
studies  are considered to be representatives 
of countries that follow individualist man-
agement ideologies adopted from Anglo-
phone countries such as the the UK, the US, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Secondly, the 
availability of data and research reports, 
sourced from Comparative Public Organiza-
tion Data Base for Research (COBRA) Pro-
ject allows the author to conduct a compara-
tive analysis among them since the three 
used a similar framework.  
Whilst, the COBRA report (Verhoest 
et al, 2012) analyzes 30 countries in  broader 
contexts, this essay aims to conduct an in-
depth report on  Thailand, Hong Kong, and 
Pakistan. The three case studies were  cho-
sen to reflect the Asian perspective on 
agencification.  
The paper begins with a discussion of 
theoretical aspects and debates of agencifica-
tion , which is aimed at  obtainining  a com-
prehensive understanding of agencification. 
Subsequently, empirical studies and experi-
ences of some selected countries from litera-
ture will be presented and compared based 
on the main aspect of agencification. This 
comparative analysis showed that the NPM 
agency model is not the only major factor 
that is perceived to be the driving force of 
agencification, but also contextualization 
and localism also play an important role in 
the agencification process in the three coun-
tries  studied. In the discussion section, I will 
analyze major findings of the three case 
studies from which  Indonesia can draw les-
sons from their experiences.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study used literature review as 
the main research method. Data were  drawn 
from Comparative Public Organization Data 
Base for Research (COBRA) on agencifica-
tion, which is  documented in Verhoest et al 
(2012) that  compares agencification process 
in 30 countries. The literature review process 
was conducted through a snowball technique 
and considered all the works published in 
relation to the major themes of the study that 
included  agency, agencification, semi-
autonomous agency, Thailand, Hong Kong, 
and Pakistan. 
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With regards to agencification process 
in Thailand,  empirical case studies conduct-
ed by Bowornwathana (2012) which drawn 
from COBRA project were the main  litera-
ture source. While, supporting literature 
were obtained from  Autonomisation of the 
Thai state: Some observations 
(Bowornwathana, 2006) and Autonomy and 
Performance of Agentification: Cases of 
Nine Independent Agencies in Thailand 
(Lorsuwannarat 2014).  
Meanwhile, for the case of agencifica-
tion in Hong Kong,  empirical case studies 
that were conducted  by Painter (2012) (also 
part of COBRA project) served as the  main 
literature source. To supplement the main  
literature sources, other articles were used 
that included Coordinating the government 
bureaucracy in Hong Kong: An institutional 
analysis (Lam, 2005); Budgetary reforms in 
two city states: impact on the central budget 
agency in         Hong Kong and Singapore 
(Cheung, 2006); The new public manage-
ment reform and governance in Asian NICs: 
A comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore 
(Lee & Haque 2006); Statutory bodies as 
instruments of government in Hong Kong: 
Review beginnings and analytical challenge 
ahead (Thynne, 2006) ; and Task Matters: A 
Structural-Instrumental Analysis of the Au-
tonomy of Hong Kong Government Bodies 
(Painter & Yee, 2010). 
As regards agencification in  Pakistan, 
empirical case studies conducted by Jadoon, 
Jabeen, & Rizwan, (2012) (also part of CO-
BRA project) served as  the  main literature 
source. Like in the other two cases, supple-
mentary literature was used. The literature 
included among others, Agencification in 
Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Regulato-
ry and Service Delivery Agencies (Jadoon, 
2010) ; Agencification of Public Service De-
livery in Developing Societies: Experiences 
of Pakistan and Tanzania Agency Models 
(Ncukwe & Adejuwon 2014); and Autono-
my of public agencies in Pakistan: does 
structure matter? (Zahra & Jadoon, 2016) 
The above multiple case studies were 
treated as literature sources that were used to 
obtain deeper understanding of the main and 
supplementary features of respective agenci-
fication processes that in turn provided in-
sights into the forms that different cases took 
as well as complexity. 
In addition, the overarching objective 
of the study was to conduct a comparative 
analysis of the agencification process in the 
selected case studies by highlighting similar-
ities and differences among them.  That way, 
the researcher was able to identify the main 
features that were common and those that 
were different, across agencification pro-
cesses in the three case studies. Subsequent-
ly, the research was able to draw some les-
sons from their agencification experiences.  
As Rihoux & Ragin, (2009) noted,  human 
reasoning is very much driven by compari-
son, and went on to suggest that comparison 
is a key approach in any empirical scientific 
efforts.  Understanding phenomena is facili-
tated by recognizing and comparing one to 
others.  
Comparative case study approach has 
been used for a long time in social and polit-
ical science discipline.  Aristotle, conducted 
a comparative social analysis of constitu-
tions of 184 city-states in Mediterranean, 
hence considered as one of the pioneers of 
the approach. However, the systematic com-
parative study is relatively new, hence has 
not been that much used (Peters, 1990). 
Through comparison, political phenomena 
can be theorized as general preposition 
(Hopkin, 2010:289).  
Following Jreisat (2011), this study 
studies attributes and performance of admin-
istrative systems  in order to identify and 
recognize similarities and differences of 
agencification process adopted in each case 
study. Additionally, the study places empha-
sis on successful or failed practices, thus, 
guiding alternative strategies for improving 
administrative reform outcomes. 
 
Comparative Design 
Practically, this study is a cross-
national comparative study as it compares 
several countries and specific institutions at 
a certain point in time (Figure 1). Thus, it is 
different from a longitudinal study,  which 
emphasizes  time frame (Peters, 1990). Dur-
ing the analysis process, institutions, states, 
and central processes were combined to have 
a better understanding of the similarities and 
differences of the agencification process im-
plemented among them. 
 Five basic approaches in comparative 
research are generally used (Fleming, 1970; 
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Hopkin, 2010; Lim, 2010; Peters, 1998)   
a. Most Similar System (MSS) design 
where the locus is countries which 
have similar features,  
b. Most Different System (MDS) design , 
where the locus entails  countries 
which have different feature except the 
themes under investigation,  
c. Generally Similar Group (GSG) de-
sign, where a group of homogenous 
countries is examined with respect to 
their group similarities. It is akin to 
MSS design but without strict modes 
of MSS.  
d. Structural Functional System (SFS) 
design, the locus lies in emphasis on 
structural-functional approaches like 
political structure, culture, and deci-
sion-making process. 
e. Global Statistical Analysis (GSA) de-
sign which uses statistical variable 
comparison within countries under ex-
amination.  
 
Most Similar System (MSS) design is 
used in analyzing similar jurisdiction in 
which agencification occurs. Thus, MSS is 
the most suitable to hold most variables un-
der study relatively constant and thus control 
for concomitant variation (Peters, 1998)  
 
According to Lim (2010), the purpose 
of comparison can be categorized into three 
facets, that include control, understand, and 
explain. Firstly, comparison is done in order 
exercise control, which means that the com-
parison of cases is designated to verify or 
falsify their hypothesis. Secondly, a compar-
ative study is conducted to understand the 
phenomena. Lastly, the use of comparative 
approach is to build stronger theoretical ex-
planation.  
Drawing from the rationale of this 
study, the author primarily aims to under-
stand the phenomena of agencification, so 
that both academic and practitioners can take 
some lessons learned from this study. This 
purpose focuses on interpretation which be-
gins with case selection and use of existing 
theory to analyze the case study.  
   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Understanding Agencification 
Agencification has many terms. 
OECD, (2002) calls it ‘distributed public 
governance’; Pollitt & Talbot (2003) used 
the notion of ‘unbundled government’; while 
Overman & van Thiel (2015) preferred to 
refer to it as ‘semi-autonomous agencies’ to 
address the phenomena. The variety of 
names of agencification, regardless agencifi-
cation has been a key feature of NPM-
oriented public sector reform. The disaggre-
gation from monolithic-centred government 
bureaucracy to more business-like, lean gov-
ernment agencies is posited to improve effi-
ciency in delivering public services (Hood, 
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2001). 
The idea of agencification allows gov-
ernments to divide ministerial and depart-
mental portfolio institutions into smaller-
disperse units, which operate at arm's length 
of government and are responsible for carry-
ing public tasks like education, social wel-
fare, market regulation and other public af-
fairs. The agency model can be distinguished 
from the traditional bureaucratic model in 
that it combines expertise, autonomy, and 
specialisation of tasks in a narrow range of 
policy issues (Majone, 1997) and character-
ised by structural devolution but still part of 
public domain, funded and financed by pub-
lic (James & van Thiel, 2010). 
Nonetheless, creating a uniform defini-
tion of agencification concept is truly a diffi-
cult task. This is due to the fact that despite 
the proliferation agencies, contextual factors 
that underpin such a process has hampered 
efforts to create single definition of the con-
cept. In any case, not all type of agencies in 
many countries fit every case of agencifica-
tion phenomena.  
In practice, differences in administra-
tive systems make standardization of struc-
ture of agencies and their procedural system 
difficult. Nonetheless, there is a common 
pattern which characterizes most agencifica-
tion process wherever it occurs. The notion 
that agencification involves the creation of 
separate agencies with the goal of imple-
menting a policy or tackling special affairs is 
supported and accepted by many scholars. In 
addition, the separate agency is accorded 
special privilege to operate within a semi-
autonomous framework. 
However, to understand the concept of 
agencification requires a good understanding 
of what the agency is. It is widely argued 
that agencies are at arm's length from the 
main hierarchical spines of ministries, and 
carry out public tasks (service provision, 
regulation, adjudication, and certification) at 
a national level. Many of them have core 
staff who are public servants and are fi-
nanced by the state budget. From the  legali-
ty perspective, agency is subject to at least 
some administrative laws (Pollitt et al., 
2004).  
Trondal (2014:545) defines agency as 
“an administrative body that is formally sep-
arated from a ministerial, or cabinet-level, 
department and that carries out public tasks 
at a national level on a permanent basis, is 
staffed by public servants, is financed main-
ly by the state budget, and is subject to pub-
lic legal procedures”.  
Similarly, Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert, 
& Verschuere (2004) argued that an agency 
will gain autonomy due to its separation with 
ministry or central government and is freed 
from political affluence. They argued that an 
agency as a structurally disaggregated body 
is formally separated from the central gov-
ernment. Agency carries out public tasks at 
the national level on a permanent basis, is 
staffed by public servants, is financed main-
ly by the state budget, and is subject to pub-
lic legal system. However, they also noticed 
that the agency is not totally independent, 
because executives normally have ultimate 
political responsibility for its operations. 
 
In addition, Verhoest et al (2004)  
statement on characteristic of an agency 
does not cover agencification in many coun-
tries where the operation of agencies is not 
handled by civil service system, but non-
civil service system or those funded by the 
money mobilized from society. Further, the 
definition that consider agency to operate at 
national level is no longer relevant. The 
agency model now practiced at the local lev-
el as well. 
Overman & van Thiel (2015) offered 
more generic and practically simple exposi-
tion by stressing on the structural disaggre-
gation of the structure of the  agency from 
the  ministry, carries out public tasks, and 
operates under more business-like conditions 
than traditional government bureaucracies. 
Thus, agencies possess managerial autono-
my to shape their own organizational struc-
ture and have autonomy in managing their 
personnel and financial matters.  
From the above definition, three main 
components of agencification which will 
prominently appeared in the body of litera-
ture can be identified. Firstly, the concept of 
disaggregation refers to the degree of agency 
that is separated from parent ministries. This 
component underpins efforts to split up large 
public sector hierarchies from unitary to 
multi-firm structures; achieving wider, flat-
ter hierarchies internally; and specifying in-
formation and managerial systems lead dif-
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ferent pattern of control (Dunleavy, Mar-
getts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006). By implica-
tion agencification induces more flexibility 
in personnel systems such as recruitment, 
training, and promotion. “The iron cage of 
civil service central regulations will be re-
laxed” (Pollit et al., 2001: 277).  
In the broader concept of governance, 
the agencification phenomena is in accord-
ance to the notion of horizontal governance. 
Pratikno (2008) stated that horizontalism is 
inter-organizational relation from govern-
ance actors. Drawing from that understand-
ing, disaggregation can also be recognized as 
some effort to achieve horizontal govern-
ment. It also leads to the networked-
governance, rather than hierarchical mecha-
nism.  
Secondly, the agency which formally 
separated from their parent ministries is of-
ten subject to regulation by other organiza-
tion which related with the degree of inde-
pendence or autonomy. The concept of au-
tonomy or ‘autonomization’ (Pollitt et al., 
2004) designates the degree to which an 
agency is institutionally separated from par-
ent ministry and whether the agency is given 
freedom to manage the organization to carry 
out their tasks and core businesses. The ex-
pectation is that autonomy can enhance per-
formance since the public manager is ac-
corded freedom to focus on outcomes rather 
than procedures, like their counterparts in 
private organization.  
Another argument places the public 
managers’ autonomy as an essential factor to 
liberalize the conduct of innovations and 
breakthroughs. There is no doubt that public 
managers have more formal constraints. 
higher  public expectations. And higher po-
litical dynamic influence than private man-
agers (Muchiri, 1999:50) 
Furthermore, OECD (2007) contends 
that  autonomy within agencies  induces and 
incentivizes the performance of  public sec-
tor managers to be output and outcome-
focused. Usually, agencies have various de-
grees of autonomies in carrying out their ac-
tivities. On a more technical  note, some 
scholars developed dimensions and indica-
tors that are used in examining organization-
al autonomy such as formal Independence of 
Regulatory Agencies (Gilardi, 2002) and 
organizational autonomy map comprises  
management, policy, structural, financial and 
interventional autonomy (Verhoest et al., 
2012). Nonetheless, while agencies are 
structurally autonomous, the real autonomy 
of agencies with respect to performance is 
still a contested notion.  
Thirdly, the separation and degree of 
autonomy create  accountability and control 
concerns. Thus, the agencification discourse  
has some bearing to  principal-agent theory. 
Pollitt et al (2004:39) used the terms of 
‘contractualization’ to denote many respon-
sibilities  an agent  has in carrying out its 
business core with the specific contract to 
the parent ministry as the principal in the 
basis of performance. Under this premise, 
performance management lies at the center 
of agencification through such a process, the 
parent ministry can steer and control their 
agency in the corpus of accountability. In the 
modern-democracy context accountability is 
not only focused on both organizational an-
swerability and  macro- sociological level 
(Wicaksono, 2015). This premise encour-
ages public organizations to seriously posit 
their public accountability as their substan-
tial agenda.    
From the above features, the idealisti-
cally and logical explanation of agency en-
compasses an agency that is separated from 
parent ministry, and is vested with autonomy 
which limits political influence within for-
mal contractual or quasi-contractual arrange-
ments. The contract relates to performance 
management as steering and control gears. 
This also means that performance manage-
ment mechanism is used as an accountability 
mechanism. Besides, some discretion is re-
quired in dealing with problems and   com-
plexity in operationalization which an agen-
cy faces.   
According to Massey & Pyper 
(2005:85), the agencification process has its 
strenghts and weaknesess. The upshot of 
agencification lies in the evolution of an effi-
cient civil service. Whilst, the downside re-
lates to the decline in organizational cohe-
siveness, which balkanization of service de-
livery into independent components engen-
ders.  
The notion of balkanization is used to 
denote the breakup of big government and 
splitting up of public tasks into smaller piec-
es as independent public bodies that deliver 
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public service. This structural issues linked 
to changes in management as well as the 
practices resulting  from new faces in the 
government. Consequently, many new pub-
lic bodies were emerged and changed the 
government structures as it becomes more 
decentralized.  
A number of model have been devel-
oped to explain the rise of agencification. 
Epistemologically,  Pollitt et al (2004: 12-
31) classified the root of agencification as 
emanating from three streams which include 
economic or rational choice tradition, tradi-
tional social sciences, and constructivist ap-
proach. 
Rational choice emphasises efficiency  
as the justification. This relates to a bloated  
government that is required to undertake 
economic austerity. It compels governments 
to cut their budgets and rightsize the bureau-
cracy. Among the scholars who support the 
perspective,  for instance,  encompass the 
bureau-shaping model,  which entails politi-
cians and senior civil servants creating agen-
cies that are aimed at pursuing work-related 
benefits from different organizational form 
(Dunleavy, 1991; James, 2003). In the same 
vein, principal-agent theory, which by and 
large,  argues that agencies will carry out 
functions that are delegated by principals on 
the basis of the nature, coverage, and com-
position of the contract (Molander & Nils-
son, 2002; van Thiel, 2001; van Thiel & 
Leeuw, 2002); and delegation theory, which 
associates agencification with benefits of  
contributing to political credibility due to the 
de-politicization and increase of efficiency 
in decision-making and policy implementa-
tion (Majone, 2001). 
Traditional social science approach 
emphasizes empirical regularities. Some of 
the scholars such as Kickert, (2001) and  
Pierre (2004) who are scholars of the stream 
contend that the creation of  agencies differs 
considerably among jurisdictions. That said, 
efficiency motives have been identified as 
some of the key drivers. This is borne out by 
empirical experiences of agencification. The 
perspective used empirical evidence of 
agencification to explain the agencification 
phenomena and its consequences. Strong 
evidence that is gleaned from empirical re-
search lends support to the notion that is 
supported by many scholars in public admin-
istration who support this school of thought.    
Meanwhile, constructivist theories 
base their analysis on social construction, 
which includes cultures but not limited to 
traditions, structures, norms, and values that 
have significantly influences on the agencifi-
cation process. The task-specific path de-
pendency model is one of the constructivists 
approach in agencification research (Pollitt 
et al., 2004) which challenges both the ra-
tional choice and traditional social science 
approach, arguing that explaining agencifi-
cation phenomena requires social construc-
tion. Social construction and logic underpins 
the way governments decide to establish an 
agency is intricately linked to the central in-
quiry of agencification research.  
 
Comparative Analysis 
After discussing the theoretical frame-
work on the core characteristics and ideal 
types of agencification, it now the turn to 
delving into the actual practice and experi-
ence of agencification in Thailand, Hong 
Kong, and Pakistan. The comparative study 
is accorded special attention landscapes of 
agencies, history, drivers and characteristics 
including autonomy and control mechanisms 
in the public service delivery system (Table 
1). 
 
Thailand 
Thailand’s agencification is insepara-
ble from external factors. In line with struc-
tural reform after financial crisis which was 
facilitated by Iinternational Mmonetary 
Fund assistance, the first initiative on Thai 
agencification began in 1999 with the deci-
sion of Thai government to borrow the 
agencification idea and experience from the 
United Kingdom’s executive agencies and 
New Zealand’s crown entities. To that end, 
the adoption of the idea which has its origin 
in the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
implied that Thai administration adopted one 
form of NPM discipline. This influence be-
gan in Thailand in the early 1990s, with the 
establishment of various quasi-autonomous 
organizations for public services, including 
those that were charged with fostering and 
strengthening the industry competitiveness 
and capabilities, especially small and medi-
um supporting industries (Lorsuwannarat, 
2014).  
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In Thailand, the agency is called Au-
tonomous Public Organizations (APOs) 
which are managed by committees or 
boards. They mainly operate in the fields of 
education, training and development, art and 
culture, sports, research and environment, 
health and social welfare. The establishment 
of APO does not require approval of the par-
liament, rather authorization of the King is 
sufficient. Thus, by eliminating the need for 
the approval of Thai legislature, the regula-
tion vested the executive arm of government 
with more authority to establish new APOs. 
Nonetheless, from the perspective accounta-
bility, absence the vital role of parliament in 
establishing APO signals reduced-
accountability. 
After one decade, Thai agencification 
has proliferated as the government  has on 
average been creating at least two to three 
agencies annually and by 2006 only two  
agencies have had their operation  terminat-
ed (Bowornwathana, 2006: 27). The passion 
to create new APOs emerged when high 
government officials have a strong motiva-
tion to do so. To that end, the process of 
agencification in Thailand can be described 
as being based on bureau-shaping model 
(Dunleavy, 1991). Whenever bureaucrats 
wish to expand their organizations, new 
APOs that have new authorities and budget 
ramifications are established.  
Thus, based on the above description, 
Thai agencification can be described as op-
erationalization of bureaucratization within 
the agencification. It influences the degree of 
autonomy and control over APOs. Further-
more, increasing numbers of  APOs in Thai-
land has largely generated more benefits to 
politicians and high-level bureaucrats than  
improvement in public service deliveries 
(Bowornwathana, 2006, 2012). 
Moreover, based on research conduct-
ed by Lumtanshub (2011) in Verhoest et al., 
(2012:387), APOs in Thailand used ‘Strong 
Board, Weak CEO’ model. In Thailand, the 
management of APOs consisted of two man-
agerial entities. Based on the locus of ac-
countability, agencies can be distinguished 
as boards which are accountable to the min-
ister and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
who is charged of day-to-day APOs’ admin-
istration. ‘Strong Board, weak CEO’model 
underpins the asymmetrical relationship be-
tween board members and CEO in which 
board members have a stronger influence 
than CEO in managing APOs. In this case, 
the hierarchical accountability is very evi-
dent, which contrary to NPM principle that 
requires agencies to conduct their tasks on a 
contractual basis rather than following the 
traditional hierarchy. 
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  Thailand Hong Kong Pakistan 
Initiation Autonomous Public Organi-
zation Act of 2542/1999 
Emerged in 1960’s with 
structural adjustment in 1997 
From 1946 and legally struc-
tured after 1999 
Role Model UK and New Zealand UK UK 
Landscape Growing 2-3 agencies annu-
ally 
Growing significantly 1980-
1990 
Growing significantly after 
1999 
Characteristics Driven by political process 
Hierarchical accountability 
Uphold ‘limited government’ 
principle (rationality) 
Less controversy in political 
zone 
Driven by regime power and 
development paradigm 
No result-based measure-
ment system 
Autonomy Low Low in financial manage-
ment 
High in personnel, operation-
al and strategic policy 
Adequate autonomy in per-
sonnel, operational and 
managerial 
  
Control Highly control  through par-
ent minister 
Steering and monitoring 
performance 
Traditional control by parent 
ministry 
Absent of performance-
based control 
Contextualization yes Yes yes 
Table 1. Comparison of Agencification 
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However, the Thai government sub-
jects APOs to the same rules, regulations 
and particular monitoring system that apply 
to other government organizations. The im-
plication of the above mechanism is that the 
autonomy of APOs is questionable. In fact, 
Bowornwathana (2012) calls it as ‘Thai-style 
agencification in a bundled government’ 
which is characterized by the expansion of 
bureaucracy and not managed at arms-length 
rather under the arms of parent ministries. 
Therefore, it is contrary to the ideal type of 
agencification which involves reducing the 
size of bureaucratization, emphasizes effi-
ciency and operates under flexible-
autonomous features. 
Another study conducted by Lorsu-
wannarat (2014) applied the concepts of 
agentification of NPM to examine the multi-
dimensions of autonomy and to evaluate the 
performance of the 9 agencies, with respect 
to effectiveness, financial self-reliance, and 
the impact on industrial development. The 
study used both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in collecting data using three fo-
cus groups, 37 in-depth interviews, and 3428 
questionnaire surveys. Study findings 
showed that agencification in Thailand gen-
erated side effects whenever actors who 
were involved with the transformation did 
not always act rationally.  
There was no clear-cut division be-
tween the central department and the agen-
cies. While the department was expected to 
transfer its duties to the new agencies, such 
duties remained under the control and over-
sight of departments. Thus, the process was 
plagued by overlapping of duties since the 
departments continued to carry out similar 
functions that had ostensibly been trans-
ferred to the agencies.   
To overcome the problems, Lorsu-
wannarat (2014) recommended two policy 
suggestions. Firstly, the need to restructure 
both organizational structures and the rela-
tionship framework between the ministry 
and the agencies. To eliminate duplication 
problems, there should be coordination 
mechanism between ministries and agencies 
in the conduct of their duties. Secondly, the 
need for clear policy guidelines to regulate 
ministries and agencies in conducting their 
duties and delivering public services. 
 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong -the city state- was re-
turned to China from British rule in 1997. 
China adopted ‘one country two system’ 
policy in which Hong Kong has its own le-
gal system, police, tax, and budget authority 
except defence affairs. In fact, the people of 
Hong Kong have never achieved democracy. 
Administrative structures are strongly influ-
enced by the British system and wider Com-
monwealth practices, yet familiar Westmin-
ster systems of democratic political control 
and accountability were not transplanted. 
However, Hong Kong’s bureaucracy has 
vast  experience in automatization and or-
ganizational differentiation albeit being cen-
tralized and undemocratic government 
(Painter, 2012: 342).  
The notion of agencies is not some-
thing new in Hong Kong, and it can be 
traced to the British administrative system 
inherited in 1960’s. The system is character-
ized by spate of voluntary associations and 
business organizations providing service de-
livery to the society (Painter, 2012; Painter 
& Yee, 2010; Thynne, 2006). 
The increasing number of agencies in 
Hong Kong was very evident after 1980 
when 60% of existing bodies were created. 
To that end, the above  phenomena corrobo-
rates the argument that NPM has led the pro-
liferation of agencies in terms of numbers 
and types (James, 2003). From the autonomy 
perspective, Hong Kong has enjoyed autono-
mous agencies. Based on the COBRA online 
survey of 111 government bodies which are 
product of agencification, attest to the exist-
ence and achievement of autonomy. None-
theless, autonomy of agencies varied by 
function with lowest autonomy identified in 
financial management and higher autonomy 
found in realms of personnel, operational, 
and strategic policy.  
The above condition is attributable to 
the fact that Hong Kong government laid 
emphasis on budgeting and financing the 
delivery of public services (Cheung, 2006) 
motivated by the need to maintain low tax 
regime. In addition, the high participation of 
voluntary associations and business organi-
zations which is a legacy of British adminis-
trative system also help to enhance the au-
tonomy of agencies.  
Another explanation is attributed to  
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Painter & Yee (2010). In their work, they 
used the structural-instrumental analysis to 
study the Autonomy of Hong Kong Govern-
ment Bodies. The study used data that were 
obtained from a survey of perceptions about 
autonomy of agencies of chief executives of 
111 Hong Kong government agencies, the 
study explored a series of propositions on 
the relationships between structure, task, and 
perceived autonomy.  
In their study Painter & Yee (2010) 
determined that explaining the degree of au-
tonomy of agencies required analyzing struc-
ture  and task as variables. However, public 
service delivery organizations face tighter, 
not looser control, while regulatory agencies 
show no tendency becoming more autono-
mous. The inference that can draw from this 
is that Hong Kong’s constitutional and polit-
ical history underscore the importance of 
contextualization in the implementation of 
agencification.   
As a contract-based organization, an 
agency is closely bounded by performance 
measurement. To control the agencies, per-
formance measurement framework was put 
in place and entailed such mechanism as tar-
get-based management and performance 
measurement system. Thus, in the perspec-
tive of principal-agent theory, the Hong 
Kong context fall in the category of an ideal 
practice.  Another important facet of agenci-
fication in Hong Kong is that the govern-
ment maintained lean government, making 
the agencification not a contentious issue. 
Agencies are charged with carrying out both 
political and administrative roles (Painter, 
2012:350).  
This argument corroborates with Lee 
& Haque (2006) who compare the NPM-
based Reform and governance in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. The conclusion drawn 
was that political regimes contributed to 
shaping NPM reforms the polities imple-
mented with defining features including 
macroeconomics, political systems, and tra-
ditions. 
 
Pakistan       
Pakistan is one of the former British 
colonies in South Asia which have imple-
mented agencification. Like Hong Kong, 
agency is also not something new to Paki-
stan. Pakistan bequeathed  many agencies 
from the colonial era (Jadoon, 2010). Narrat-
ed in national good governance doctrines, 
the structural adjustment commenced in 
1999. During this period, agencies were 
dominated new-specific task and public ser-
vice deliveries in areas of health, education, 
training, and research, among other.  
According to Jadoon et al. (2012), 
agencification in Pakistan mirrored the histo-
ry of Country’s  development  and it can be 
divided into 4 phases. The four phases in-
clude development administration (1947-
1971), development enterprise (1972-1977), 
development management (1977-1999), and 
development governance (1999-2010). The 
agencification landscapes was influenced by 
the development paradigm Pakistan adopted 
in each phase and period. However,  the de-
velopment governance era (1999-2010) has 
the largest number of agencies created (70 
agencies). Of the 70 agencies that were es-
tablished during 1999-2010, 15 were regula-
tory bodies.  
With regards to the external influence 
that bore to agencification in Pakistan,  
Ncukwe & Adejuwon (2014) argued that 
Pakistan’s agencification was influenced by 
policy guidance of the World Bank. Thus, 
international pressure, in part palyed a role 
in the nature, number, and the structure of 
public sector agencies that created which 
followed similar guidelines to other part of 
the world. 
The autonomy of agencies depends on 
their type of legal-structure. Semi-
autonomous agencies have a significant level 
of managerial autonomy but lack of  legal 
identity. Moreover, policy control was for-
mally vested in the federal government with 
agencies under tutelage  of the minister. To 
that end, the span of control  went  to the 
minister of the parent ministry, through the 
prime minister and ultimately to the national 
parliament. “…all semi-autonomous bodies 
and autonomous bodies are expected to sub-
mit their annual reports to their parent minis-
tries”(Jadoon et al., 2012: 379). Under the 
scheme, agencification which was adopted 
in Pakistan was characterized by  traditional-
hierarchical accountability. Thus, the span of 
control and accountability affected agency’s 
autonomy, even though  the administration 
of the agency had managerial  flexibility.  
From the rational choice perspective, 
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Zahra & Jadoon (2016) examined the rela-
tionship between structural arrangements of 
Pakistan public agencies and their autonomy 
they enjoy. The study was based on a ques-
tionnaire that involved the key informants 
from 70 public agencies of Pakistan.  
Research results identified structural 
dimensions, horizontal specialization, verti-
cal specialization and the governing board as 
key variables. It is only governing board that 
was found to have influenced on the autono-
my of human resource management dimen-
sion while vertical specialization bear rela-
tion to autonomy in the realm of financial 
management. Results did not support any 
one of the three hypotheses entirely.  Mean-
while, results from the structural instrumen-
tal perspective indicated the importance of 
other factors related to agencies that include 
administrative culture and context of state. 
The agencification process in Pakistan 
was implemented under an administrative 
system that had weak political institutions 
but a strong entrenched bureaucracy. The 
strong wave of the bureaucratization can be 
traced to the features of strong colonial bu-
reaucratic traditions that was manifested by 
the centralization of power exercised by a 
certain class of senior bureaucrats. By and 
large, such bureaucrats, occupy top positions 
in federal ministries. 
From the three case studies, an infer-
ence can be made that there are similarities, 
variations and diverse pathways of agencifi-
cation adopted in three countries. Two simi-
larities stand out in three cases. Firstly, 
agencification adopted in three countries was 
influenced by Anglo-Saxon model with the 
apogee of agency proliferation occurring 
during NPM heydays after the 1980s. Sec-
ondly, context matter in shaping and influ-
encing agencification process in the three 
countries. 
However, there were variations in 
terms of initiation, characteristics, autonomy 
and control among these countries. In Thai-
land, agencification came into force under 
Act Number 2542/1999, while both Hong 
Kong and Pakistan as former British colo-
nies, agencification was already underway 
prior to attaining their independence and in-
corporated into legal structure during  
1990’s. The characteristic of agencification 
in Thailand was driven by political process 
and had hierarchical accountability. Mean-
while, agencification adopted in Hong Kong 
was characterized by focus on rationality, 
hence was devoid political contentions. Pa-
kistan had also different features influenced 
by the regime in power and very much in 
line with the trajectory of development para-
digm at the time. Further Pakistan agencifi-
cation was not based on result-based meas-
urement system. 
Agencification process in Hong Kong 
was characterized by autonomy in personnel, 
operations and strategic policy, but limited 
financial autonomy. Agencification in Paki-
stan enjoyed personnel, operational and 
managerial autonomy. Finally, agencifica-
tion in Thailand had the lowest autonomy. 
 
What can Indonesia learn from experienc-
es of the three countries? 
Agencification refers to the process of 
transferring policies from one jurisdiction to 
another,  Moynihan (2006) identified three 
processes of interpretation for policy-
makers. The three process include (1) adopt 
superficially similar policy concepts; (2) 
overlook negative experiential learning; and 
(3) adopt policies unsuitable to the national 
context. He argued that agencification is 
plagued by policy ambiguity, which explains 
varying success across countries that adopt 
it, with some registering success while oth-
ers fail. By examining agencification phe-
nomena in the case studies, policy makers 
are able to adopt policies that fits their re-
spective environment have the ability evalu-
ate negative experiences which in the end 
enables them to determine what works and 
what doesn’t.  
Reflecting on experiences of three 
countries, public administration scholars as 
well as practitioners can draw some lessons 
learned in agencification process.  
Firstly, the rational agency model is 
not the only driver of agencification. The 
ideal suggestions from rational agency mod-
el are not easy to implement in the actual 
practices. Thus, other motives such as tradi-
tions, structures, and political values play an 
important role in agencification process.  
Secondly, agencification cannot guar-
antee agency’s autonomy. One of the agenci-
fication objectives is to ensure the autonomy 
of agency, reduce political influence and im-
Arif Pratama — Agencification in Asia: Lessons from Thailand, Hong Kong, and Pakistan…. 
51 
 
Copyright © 2017, JKAP, ISSN  0852-9213 (Print), ISSN 2477-4693 (Online)   
prove performance in public service deliver-
ies. However, the experience from Thailand 
and Pakistan showed us that agencification 
does not always ensure expected autonomy 
that is required to increase performance. 
Thirdly, the ideal type of agencifica-
tion which should emphasis contract-based 
performance is not always attainable due to 
the retention of control by parent ministry. 
This implies hierarchical accountability con-
tinues to be the key mechanism that links the 
agency to the parent organization. Thus, the 
agency is not assessed based on performance 
but political interest.     
Fourthly, referring to the experience of 
Hong Kong agencification that is based on 
performance and characterized by limited 
political interest generate  more positive out-
comes than where the process is not based 
on performance and plague strong political 
intervention. Thus, agencification should 
involve the development of performance 
management system as well as minimize po-
litical intervention in its operation and man-
agement. 
Fifthly, the bureau-shaping model 
(Dunleavy, 1991; James, 2003) in agencifi-
cation initiatives which is motivated by the 
desire of bureaucrats to enlarge the bureau-
cracy structure as well as budget and author-
ities does not lead to the improvement in the 
quality of governance but increase govern-
ment burden. 
Sixthly, the importance of 
‘contextualization’ in adopting foreign-based 
public sector reforms (such as agencifica-
tion) need to be considered to minimize un-
intended consequences. Culture and localism 
play important roles in shaping public sector 
reform process.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up, it can be argued that three 
countries have implemented agencification 
in different ways. In terms of agencification 
motives, the rational agency model is not the 
only driver of agencification but, equally 
important is the constructivist model which 
posit the importance of traditions, structures, 
and values in agencification process. Simply 
put, agencification process is not living in a 
vacuum, rather its implementation entails an 
interplay of politics and administrative envi-
ronments to shape the implementation pro-
cess.  
Unlike Hong Kong which adopted per-
formance based agencification characterized 
by limited political intervention, both Thai-
land and Pakistan are still struggling with 
performance issues, modes of accountability, 
and political obstacles. 
Lastly, this analysis which captured 
the condition based on various empirical re-
search does have one limitation, which is 
that its findings can not  generalized to all 
Asian countries that face different settings.  
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